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Abstract
This paper presents a political economy model that is consistent with the low rate of
emission taxes in the U.S., as well as the fact that neither Democrats nor Republicans
propose to increase them. The voters di¤er according to their wage and capital in-
comes. They vote over the emission tax rate and a budgetary rule that species how to
redistribute the tax proceeds. The political competition is modeled à la Roemer (2001)
where the two parties care for the policies they propose as well as the probability of
winning; the equilibrium solution concept is the Party Unanimity Nash Equilibrium
(PUNE). We calibrate the model using U.S. data and compute the PUNEs numerically.
Two types of PUNEs emerge. In one, reecting the preferences of the militants in the
two parties, equilibrium is characterized by both parties proposing a very huge tax rate,
with Democrats typically beating the Republicans. In the other, dictated more by the
concerns of the opportunists who care most about winning elections, both o¤er subsidies
and both have a chance to win the election.
Key words: Emission taxes, political competition, PUNE, distributional concerns,
political compromise.
JEL Classication: H23, D72.
1 Introduction
The U.S. environmental policy is often criticized by the environmentalists, academics
and the media for being exceedingly lax on polluters. The criticism has been particularly
acute in relation to the greenhouse gases that burning fossil fuels emit. Two facts are
often cited to underline this. The rst is that gasoline prices are, and have traditionally
been, markedly lower in the U.S. than in any other industrial country.1 The second
is the U.S. governments refusal to join the more than 140 countries of the world who
have ratied the Kyoto protocol.2 With no policy change in the o¢ ng, one suspects
that there must exist strong political pressures pushing the US government to adhere
to its current policies. This is all the more likely as the issue is not one of Democrats
versus Republicans. Neither party supports higher gasoline taxes, nor ratifying the
Kyoto protocol.
This paper presents a political economy model that is consistent with the persistence
of the U.S. environmental policy, as well as the fact that neither party o¤ers a policy
proposal of consequence for changing it. We model the political competition à la Roe-
mer (2001) with the Party Unanimity Nash Equilibrium(PUNE) as the equilibrium
solution concept. This approach is a more realistic, and historically a more accurate,
description of the political process, as compared to the traditional approach which ex-
plains every political outcome through the prism of a median voters preferences. As
Roemer (2001) has forcefully argued, the traditional approach su¤ers from three major
shortcomings. First, its Downsian outlook, wherein the political parties (as opposed to
voters) have no preferences over policies, accords political parties no role in determining
the outcome of the political process within a society. This is plainly counterfactual.
Second, the assumption that the distribution of voter types is known for certain, is
rather dubious. Third, there is the well-known problem of the generic nonexistence of
majority-voting equilibrium when the policy space is multidimensional.
In Roemers approach, two political parties (here Democrats and Republicans) com-
pete for votes in an election. Each chooses a policy that it will implement if elected.
1Currently, a litre of gasoline is taxed about 10 cents in the U.S., compared to 96 cents in France
and 1.10 dollar in the UK.
2Australia is the only other industrial country not having signed the Kyoto protocol.
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Parties are composed of two factions: the opportunists who aim to maximize the
probability of winning the election, and the militants who are only interested in poli-
cies regardless of their electoral ramications. Unanimity between the two factions is
required for a party to accept a deviation from its current policy. This unanimity rule
determines the preferences (payo¤s) of the two parties who simultaneously choose their
political platforms. A PUNE is a Nash equilibrium of this game.
We consider a two-dimensional policy comprising a tax (or a subsidy) and a bud-
getary rule. The tax (or subsidy) is levied on the consumption of an externality
generating (polluting) good; the budgetary rule species the way the tax proceeds are
redistributed to the polity (or the way the subsidy will have to be nanced). Individuals
have identical Gorman-polar form preferences over a (non-polluting) numeraire good,
the polluting good, and the total level of emissions. The choice of Gorman-polar prefer-
ences is consistent with the empirical evidence for the income elasticity of such goods.
Poterba (1991) has estimated that, with very few exceptions, the expenditure shares
of such polluting goods as gasoline, fuel oil, natural gas, and electricity decrease at all
income deciles as income increases. The goods are produced by a linear technology
subject to constant returns to scale in a competitive environment. This is essentially
the setup we used in our earlier study; see Cremer et al. (2004a). However, that study
used a hybrid normative/positive approach and did not use actual empirical data to
calibrate the tax/subsidy rates.3
We calibrate our model using data for the U.S. economy. The voters are US house-
3Cremer et al. (2004a) assumed a unidimensional voting game over emission taxes only. We left the
disbursement of the tax revenues to be determined at a constitutional level,by a welfare maximizing
government. This led us to assert that the government should be able (under certain conditions) to
e¤ect rst-best Pigouvian emission taxes.
In Cremer et al. (2004b), we followed a positive approach throughout; but, faced with the non-
existence problem when voting simultaneously on two dimensions, we resorted to two sequential voting
procedures (with either policy being determined rst and the other later), as well as the Shepsle proce-
dure, to arrive at a political equilibrium. Restricting preferences to be quasi-linear, we found that (in
most cases) the equilibrium corresponded to the preferences of the median individual. This included
the prediction that all tax revenues must be rebated solely through either wage subsidies or capital
income subsidies. Actual policies, of course, never display such a knife-edge property.
Most recently, in Cremer et al. (2007) we revert back to models of unidimensional voting games over
emission taxes (leaving the determination of the disbursement of the tax revenues totally out). This
paper also uses actual data and the PUNE concept but in a one-dimensional framework. Additionally, it
studies the implications of the majority-voting and probabilistic-voting approaches for the equilibrium
tax rate.
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holds as represented by the 2001 Panel Study for Income Dynamics Survey, considering
the 6,877 households who reported a nonzero income (whether labor or asset incomes)
for the year 2000. We then t a bivariate lognormal distribution for labor and asset
incomes to this truncated sample (using the same weights that the survey assigns to
each household.)
The polluting good is called energy and consists of an aggregate of energy-related
consumption goods (fuel oil, gasoline, natural gas, kerosene, LPG and electricity). We
calibrate the demand function on the basis of a  0:30 price elasticity of demand (based
on the literature estimates for the price elasticity of consumer demand for energy),
a marginal propensity to consume of 2.25% and a 0:0555 ratio of average expendi-
ture on energy to average income (these last two based on the Consumer Expenditure
Surveys, 2002), with the average income being determined from the 2001 PSID data
($59; 926). The quantity of pollution is found according to the carbon content of each,
appropriately-weighted, component. Using a value of $50 for the social marginal cost
of a ton of carbon (based on the estimates reported by the EPA), we are able to cal-
culate the marginal social damage of one unit of the polluting good. Finally, we nd
the weights that the two partiesmilitants (the Democrats and the Republicans in our
setting) assign to di¤erent citizens, and the probability that a particular citizen partic-
ipates in the election, on the basis of Bartels (2002). Both weights (for both parties
militants) and turn out probabilities increase with citizenstotal income.
We show that the PUNEs that emerge may be grouped into two di¤erent types.
Type I PUNEs are characterized by both parties proposing very huge tax rates (121%
to 123% in addition to the current taxes) combined with a budgetary rule which calls for
all tax proceeds to be rebated solely on the basis of the voterscapital incomes. These
tax rates correspond to the most-preferred tax rates of the militants in the Democratic
and the Republican parties. They are extremely high, considering that the optimal
unweighted utilitarian policy calls for a tax of only about 10%; and that a person with
the median wage and the median capital income prefers the current energy prices to be
cut by as much as 89:8%: Thus these PUNEs are essentially dictated by the preferences
of the militants in the Democratic and the Republican parties, and especially by the
fact that militants in both parties put higher weights on richer individualspreferences.
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An interesting feature of these PUNEs is that they lead to a Democratic victory with
an average probability of (among all PUNEs) 91% (ranging from 90:8% to 91:2%):
Type II PUNEs share the following characteristics. First, both parties o¤er a subsidy
with respect to the current prices. Specically, the Democrats o¤er a subsidy that varies
from 0:5% to 70:9% across all PUNEs (with an average of 24:9%), while the Republicans
o¤er a subsidy varying from 0:8% to 71:6% (with an average of 30:9%). That all Type
II PUNEs entail subsidies, underscores the importance of distributional concerns in
ensuring political support for environmental policies a factor that the literature on
environmental taxation has, with few exceptions, ignored. Second, both parties o¤er
an interior solution for the budgetary rule despite the fact that all voters have extreme
preferences (they want all rebates or taxes to be linked solely either to capital incomes or
to wage incomes). This compromise turns out to be a particularly striking feature of the
PUNEs; other equilibrium concepts, even when they are not empty in multidimensional
choice sets, do not share this feature; see Cremer et al. (2004a). It underlines the
importance of generating political support for environmental policies (through political
compromise) another aspect that the literature has hitherto paid scant attention to.4
Type II PUNES thus appear to be more consistent with the making of environmental
tax policy in the US; namely, the observed reluctance of politicians to impose substantial
energy taxes. Additionally, these PUNEs have another feature consistent with reality
not present in Type I PUNEs. Under them, Democrats win with an average probability
of (among all PUNEs) 54:1% (ranging from 48:9% to 69:6%), and the Republicans
win with an average probability of 45:9% (30:4% to 51:1%). These probabilities are,
intuitively, comforting. At 54:1% and 45:9%, they are rather close. Moreover, the
maximum winning probabilities for the two parties over the set of Type II PUNEs
exceed, while their minimum winning probabilities fall below, the 50% mark. The US
environmental policy has thus been dictated more by the concerns of the opportunists
who care most about winning elections. Nevertheless, the existence of Type I PUNEs
suggests the possibility of a change in this policy and arriving at an equilibrium with
the militants at the helm. Finally simulations reveal that the same two type of PUNEs,
4Exceptions include Boyer and La¤ont (1998), Bös (2000), Brett and Keen (2000), Marsiliani and
Renström (2000), and Cremer, De Donder and Gahvari (2004a, 2004b, 2007).
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with the exact same properties, emerge under di¤erent income elasticities of demand
for polluting goods, as well as when one allows for the existing income taxes to be
distortionary. Our results appear to be quite robust.
2 The model
Individuals are identied by the type parameter = (r; w); where r is capital income
and w is labor income. Let H denote the type space;  is continuously distributed
over H according to the density function, f(). The associated cumulative distribution
function is F (). Population size is normalized at one. Total income is m() = r + w.
All sources of income are exogenous. Individuals have identical Gorman-polar form
preferences over a numeraire good (non-polluting), a polluting good, y, and the total
level of emissions due to it, Y .
The goods are produced by a linear technology subject to constant returns to scale
in a competitive environment. Normalize the producer price of y at one. Let q denote
the consumer price of y, I() the disposable income (net of taxes or transfers) and Y
the total consumption of y (across all individuals).5 The indirect utility function of an
individual of type  is given by:
v(q; I; Y ) = a(q) + b(q)I()  '(Y ); (1)
where a(q) is thrice, and b(q) and '(Y ) are twice, continuously di¤erentiable with
a0(q)  0, b0(q)  0, '0(Y ) > 0, and '00(Y )  0. Observe that, ignoring the externality
term, b0(q)  0 yields a quasi-linear specication; on the other hand, a(q)  0 represents
the case of homothetic preferences. By Roys identity, the demand for y is given by6
y(q; ) =  @v=@q
@v=@I
= c(q) + d(q)I(); (2)
where
c(q) =
 a0(q)
b(q)
> 0; and d(q) =
 b0(q)
b(q)
> 0:
5The units of measurements are chosen such that one unit of y produces one unit of emissions.
6We are assuming that the consumer has some exogenous income so that his demand for y remains
positive even if I() = 0:
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Aggregate consumption of the polluting good is then equal to
Y =
Z
H
y(q)f()d = y(q); (3)
so that total and average consumption levels are all equal. Observe that the variation
in a single individuals consumption of y will have no impact on Y .
The existing tax structure consists of labor and capital income taxes. Good y is
to be subjected to a pollution tax levied at the rate of (q   1) per unit of output.
The proceeds of the tax are refunded through reductions in labor and capital income
taxes. We do not a priori restrict it to be positive. Consequently, negative refunds
are not ruled out either. To simplify notation, we do not include pre-existing income
taxes explicitly. This implies that the income of individual  is given by
I() = (1 + gr)r + (1 + gw)w; (4)
where gr and gw are the refund rates on capital and wage incomes.
Let r, w and m denote average capital income, average labor income and average
income:
r =
Z
H
r()f()d; w =
Z
H
w()f()d; m =
Z
H
m()f()d:
The tax and refund rates are related through the governments budget constraint
R(q) = grr + gww; (5)
where R(q) is the net revenue raised from taxing the polluting good. Observe that,
in light of (5), the government has only two degrees of freedom in choosing its policy
instruments. Once q and, say, gr are set, gw is automatically determined. To represent
this in a more symmetric way, and to characterize the refund/funding system through
a single parameter, we introduce the concept of a budgetary rule. This species the
proportion of tax proceeds, ; that must be refunded on the basis of wage incomes
(alternatively, the proportion of the subsidy cost nanced by taxing wage incomes).
Formally,  is dened such that7
 =
gww
R(q)
= 1  grr
R(q)
: (6)
7 If R(q) = 0, then gr = gw = 0 as we restrict gr and gw to be of the same sign. In this case,  =
[0; 1]:
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With this notation, the tax-cum-refund policy is characterized fully by the pollution tax
(or the consumer price of y) and by the budgetary rule; i.e. by the two parameters q
and . Assume that  2 [0; 1]; this amounts to assuming that gw and gr are restricted
to be of the same sign.
2.1 Existing distortionary taxes
We do not explicitly model the existing capital and labor income taxes. However,
we account for their distortionary nature. Specically, let  denote the marginal cost
of public funds. An extra dollar of tax revenue raised through the pollution tax is
matched by a refund of 1+ dollars in order to keep the governments budget constraint
balanced. This reects the fact that lowering the existing tax rates lowers the welfare
loss associated with the current tax structure. The argument is symmetric and holds for
a subsidy on the polluting good. In this case, funding a one-dollar subsidy on polluting
goods through income taxes, costs the treasury 1 +  dollars.8 Consequently, we have,
R(q) = (1 + )(q   1)Y = (1 + )(q   1)y(q); (7)
so that R(q) is the revenue raised from taxing the polluting good plus gains due to
the reduction in the existing excess burden of income taxes [when they are cut by
(q   1)y(q) dollars]. Alternatively, for a subsidy on polluting goods, R(q) represents its
net budgetary cost.
The determination of q and  through the political process forms the core of our
study. The process is one of competition between two parties. However, we depart from
the traditional Downsian approach and instead use John Roemers Party Unanim-
ity Nash Equilibrium (PUNE) as our solution concept. We will discuss this solution
concept briey in Section 5 below. The next section examines the voterspreferences
over (q; ) and gives a characterization for the optimalsolution of (q; ). These will
provide the other ingredients for our study.
8The tax recycling issue has played a central role in the double-dividend literature. There are other
factors, e.g. the tax interaction e¤ect, that bear on the size of any potential double dividend; see
Gahvari (2002). For our purposes, one can think of  as denoting the net e¤ect of these di¤erent factors.
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3 Voterspreferences over (q; ) and the optimalpolicy
A voters preferences over tax and refund policies is derived by incorporating the gov-
ernments budget constraint (5) into his utility function (1). As a rst step, substitute
for gw and gr from equation (6) into (4). This yields
I(; ; ) = m() + (; )R(q); (8)
where
(; )  (1  )r
r
+ 
w
w
: (9)
Observe that when the polluting good is taxed, (; ) indicates the proportion of s
tax payment that he will get back in refunds. In the case of a subsidy, (; ) shows the
ratio of s income tax payments to the (price) subsidy he receives from the consumption
of the polluting good.9 Next, substituting for I from (8) into equation (1), one arrives
at the voters reduced indirect utility function,
V (q; ; ) = a(q) + b(q)

m() + (; )R(q)
  ' (y(q)) : (10)
It is clear from (10) that the size of (; ) is a crucial determinant of the impact of q
on V (q; ; ). Additionally, (; ) is the only direct channel through which  a¤ects
V (q; ; ).
3.1 Optimal policy
To characterize the optimal solution for the pair of policy instruments (q; ); we resort
to a utilitarian framework. This provides a natural benchmark against which to assess
the properties of our political solution. The utilitarian social welfare function can be
written, using (10) and (9), as
W =
Z
H
V (q; ; )f()d = a(q) + b(q) (m+R(q))  ' (y(q)) :
9To see this, substitute for  from (6) into (9). This yields
(; ) =
grr() + gww()
R(q)
:
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Observe that W is independent of  so that distributional concerns do not enter in the
determination of optimal policy. This is due to the twin assumptions of a utilitarian
social welfare function and Gorman-polar form preferences. Thus, any value for  2 [0; 1]
is as good as any other. The tax, on the other hand, does matter. Its optimal level is
found by maximizing W with respect to q: Routine algebraic manipulation leads to the
second-best polluting-good tax characterized by,
qo   1 = '
0(y(qo)) "=b(qo) + 
(1 + ) "   : (11)
where " is the absolute value of the price elasticity of aggregate demand, y(q), evaluated
at qo.10 Observe that if the capital and labor income taxes were non-distortionary,
 = 0, and the tax will be reduced to q   1 = '0(y(q))=b(q) which is the standard rst-
best Pigouvian tax (tax equals the marginal social damage of the externality). In the
second-best, the tax is adjusted by the marginal cost of public funds and the elasticity
of demand for the polluting good. The tax would be positive as long as " > =(1 + );
a condition that holds empirically.11 The formula shows that, ceteris paribus, the tax
moves negatively with the elasticity of demand for polluting good. Moreover, a higher
marginal cost of public funds tends to call for a lower tax rate if the demand is relatively
elastic, and a higher tax rate if the demand is inelastic. These are of course what one
would intuitively expect.
4 A voters most-preferred (q; )
We rst consider s most-preferred value of  conditional on q, (; q), and then his
most-preferred q conditional on , q(; ). The voters most-preferred (q; ) will then
be the solution to q = q (; (; q)) and  =  (; q(; )).
10The second-order condition for this problem is
b(q)y0
h
1 + 2   y y
00
(1 + )y02
  '
00(y)y0
b(q)
+
b0(q)'0(y)
b2(q)
i
< 0;
which we assume to be satised.
11The smallest reported estimate for " is 0:15. Even with this small gure, the condition will be
satised as long as  < 0:18. See Fullerton (1991) who shows that using the change in actual tax
revenue and the equivalent variation measure for a welfare change in calculating the marginal cost of
public funds that  varies between 0 to 0:12.
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4.1 Characterization of (; q):
Lemma 1 characterizes (; q): It is obtained by di¤erentiating (10) partially with
respect to , making use of (9). Interestingly, it turns out, q a¤ects (; q) only
through the sign of R(q). This, in turn, depends on whether the polluting good is taxed
(q > 1); or subsidized (q < 1): We have:
Lemma 1 An individuals most-preferred value of  is given by
(; q) = 1 if
w
r
>
w
r
and R(q) > 0;
(; q) = 1 if
w
r
<
w
r
and R(q) < 0;
(; q) = 0 if
w
r
<
w
r
and R(q) > 0;
(; q) = 0 if
w
r
>
w
r
and R(q) < 0;
(; q) = [0; 1] if
w
r
=
w
r
or R(q) = 0:
The intuition behind these expressions is straightforward. Recall from (10) that 
a¤ects V (q; ; ) directly through (; ) only. It is then plain that individual  prefers
(; ) to attain its maximum value if R(q) > 0; and its minimum value if R(q) < 0:
Put di¤erently, if the polluting good is taxed and the individual is to receive a refund,
he would want the highest possible refund. On the other hand, if the polluting good
is subsidized and the individual is to be taxed to nance it, he would want to pay the
lowest possible (income) tax.
The rst and fourth expressions in Lemma 1 postulate that w=r > w=r: Under this
assumption, from (9), (; ) is highest when  = 1; and lowest when  = 0: That is, if
the individuals share of labor income is larger than average,he would want to link
the refunds (if the voters are to get refunds) solely to labor incomes which would get
him the highest refunds. And if he were to be taxed (on income), he would want to link
the tax solely to capital incomes which would assure him the lowest tax payment.
In contrast, the assumption in the second and third expressions of Lemma 1 is
w=r < w=r: Given this, (; ) is highest when  = 0; and lowest when  = 1: That
is, if the individuals share of labor income is smaller than average, he would want
refunds to be based solely on capital income, and tax payments solely on labor incomes.
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Finally, if w=r = w=r; it will not matter on which income source taxes and refunds are
based. In this case, the individuals utility is independent of :12
4.2 Characterization of q(; ).
Lemma 2, proved in the Appendix, characterizes q(; ).
Lemma 2 Let eq(;m)=argmaxq[a(q)+mb(q)+b(q)R(q) '(y(q))]:We have q(; ) =eq ((; );m()) so that q depends on  only through ; with
@eq
@
=
b(q) [R0(q)  d(q)R(q)]
 @2V (q; ; )=@q2 ; (12)
@eq
@m
=
b0(q)
 @2V (q; ; )=@q2  0: (13)
It follows from Lemma 2 that if income e¤ects on the demand for y are negligible
(as with quasi-linear preferences), richer individuals (regardless of the income source)
prefer a higher tax. To see this, observe that with quasi-linear preferences, incomes
a¤ect eq only through . Moreover, assuming that rational agents do not want to be on
the downward section of the La¤er curve,R0(q) > 0 and @eq=@ > 0. The result then
follows from the fact that  increases with w and r. Now the presence of income e¤ects
imply that eq moves negatively with w and r through (13). The net impact of income
e¤ects would then be to have taxpayers desiring a smaller tax rate or even a subsidy
(as compared to the case with no income e¤ects).
5 The Political Competition Model: PUNEs
The solution concept we use is John Roemers Party Unanimity Nash Equilibrium
(PUNE); see Roemer (2001). To make the paper self contained, we begin by giving a
brief sketch of the main features of this equilibrium concept.
Two political parties compete for votes in an election. Each chooses a policy that
it will implement if elected, and people vote for the party whose policy they prefer.
12 If one plots individuals with di¤erent labor and capital incomes in a diagram with w on the vertical
axis and r on the horizontal axis, then the line w=r = w=r which represents the set of types for whom
@(; )=@ = 0; divides the plane into two parts. People above this ray (northwest) would prefer
 = 1 with a tax and  = 0 with a subsidy. On the other hand, people below this line (southeast)
would prefer  = 0 with a tax and  = 1 with a subsidy.
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There are two departures from the classical Downs model. First, there is electoral
uncertainty: when choosing their platform, the parties do not know for sure which
party will, given the platforms, win the election. Each bases its platform selection, in
part, on the probability of winning the election. Second, parties are not interested only
in winning the election; they also care about the policies. More precisely, each party
is composed of two factions: the opportunists and the militants. These factions
are not identied with particular types of voters. The opportunists aim to maximize
the probability of winning the election; they are uninterested in policies per se. The
militants, on the other hand, are only interested in the policies announced regardless
of their electoral ramications. They choose the policy that maximizes their partys
utility(to be discussed below) without taking the electoral consequences into account.
Each faction has a complete preference order on the set of possible policies. The
preference of the party is the intersection of these two orders. Thus, unanimity be-
tween the two factions is required for a party to accept a deviation from its current
policy. This unanimity rule determines the preferences (payo¤s) of the two parties who
simultaneously choose their political platforms. A PUNE is a Nash equilibrium of this
game.
To formally dene a PUNE, index the parties by i = L;R: The objective function
of the militants is dened as
vi(q; ) =
Z
H
!i()V (q; ; )f()d; i = L;R; (14)
where !i() is the weight attributed by party is militants to individuals of type . The
probability that party i wins the election is denoted by i(qi; i; qj ; j); i; j = L;R;
i 6= j: This probability increases with the share of voters preferring party is policy to
that of party j. It is determined by assuming that each individual  participates in the
election with some probability  (): Further, assume that when both parties o¤er the
same policy, L = R = 1=2: The probability of winning the election represents the
objective function of the opportunists. We have,13
13Roemer (2001) considers a third faction, namely the reformists,who care for the partys expected
utility. They choose the electoral platform that maximizes the partys utility, taking into account the
probability of winning the election with this platform. The objective of party is reformists is thus given
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Denition 1 Let T = IR+  [0; 1] be the policy space. A Party Unanimity Nash
Equilibrium is a pair of admissible policies (qL; L); (qR; R) 2 T such that for each
i; j = L;R; i 6= j; @(q; ) 2 T with the property that, given (qj ; j), vi(q; )  vi(qi; i)
and i(q; ; qj ; j)  i(qi; i; qj ; j); where there is at least one strict inequality.
Following Roemer (2001), we shall restrict our attention to regular PUNEs which
are dened as,
Denition 2 A regular PUNE is a pair of admissible policies (qL; L); (qR; R) 2 T =
IR [0; 1] that are PUNEs, and additionally satisfy the following conditions:
(i) for each i; j = L;R; vi(qi; i)  vi(qj ; j);
(ii) for each i; j = L;R; 0 < i(qi; i; qj ; j) < 1:
Regularity is thus imposed as an additional requirement which renes the equilibrium
concept and (potentially) reduces the set of equilibria. The rst condition states that
the militants of each party prefer the policy of that party to that of the other party
(militants of, say, L prefer (qL; L) to (qR; R)): This requirement, while quite sensible,
is not automatically satised by all PUNEs. The reason is that a switch to the other
partys platform could decrease the probability of winning and thus be vetoed by the
opportunists. The second condition is essentially a technical requirement which is meant
to eliminate some pathological equilibria.
6 Data and calibrations
In order to compute the PUNEs, we must know the voters incomes and preferences.
Additionally, we should know the partiesmilitantspreferences and the probability that
a voter of a particular type would participate in the election. We take our voters to be
US households as represented by the 2001 Panel Study for Income Dynamics Survey.
by
i(qi; i; qj ; j)vi(qi; i) + (1  i(qi; i; qj ; j)) vi(qj ; j) i; j = L;R; i 6= j:
This expression shows that the reformists are purely gratuitous in this model: If both opportunists and
militants agree to a deviation, reformists will do so as well. This occurs because when both i and
vi(qi; i) increase, expected utility also increases.
Since the presence (or the absence) of reformists does not a¤ect the results, we have opted for not
introducing them.
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The survey consists of 7,406 households each of whom is assigned a weight to make the
sample representative of the US population in 2000. Naturally, we consider only those
who reported a nonzero income for the year 2000 (whether labor or asset incomes).14
These total 6,877 households. We then t a bivariate lognormal distribution for labor
and asset incomes to this truncated sample (while using the same weights that the
survey assigns to each household.)15
The next task is to calculate numerical values for the parameters of the individu-
alsutility function. The polluting good is called energy and consists of an aggregate
of energy-related consumption goods (fuel oil, gasoline, natural gas, kerosene, LPG
and electricity). Given the Gorman-polar specication, we have y(q) =  a0(q)=b(q)  
b0(q)=b(q)I: Assume b(q) = 1   q: This allows us to capture the di¤erence between
Gorman-polar and quasi-linear specications for preferences through a single parame-
ter, . The demand function is thus written as
y(q) =
 a0(q)
1  q +

1  q I:
Assuming that the rst expression in the right-hand side of above is linear in price (with
a constant term), we calculate the three parameters of the resulting equation (constant
term, coe¢ cient of q; and the parameter ) on the basis of a marginal propensity to
consume energy out of income equal to 2:25% (equal to a value of 0:405 for the income
elasticity of demand for the average consumer), price elasticity of demand equal
to  0:30, and a ratio of average expenditure on energy to average income equal to
0:0555; with the average income being $59; 926.16 All our calculations are based on the
14Specically, we calculate labor incomes as the sum of labor income, and labor part of the business
income, of the Head of the household and his spouse. To calculate the householdsasset incomes, we
subtract each familys labor income (as we have calculated it), transfer income, social security income
and the Heads farm income, from the familys reported total income.
15Recall that our model postulates that voters di¤er only in two dimensions: labor and asset incomes.
The mean, median and standard deviation are $50,294, $36,100 and $64,825 for labor incomes, and
$9,632, $433, and $42,838 for asset incomes. The Correlation coe¢ cient between labor and asset incomes
is 0.163 a gure which is in line with the numerical calculation of Champernowne and Cowell (1998)
who report a correlation coe¢ cient of 0.135 using 1985 PSID data.
16The  0:30 gure is based on the literature estimates for the price elasticity of consumer demand for
energy. These vary from  0:35 to  0:15; see Branch (1993), Filippini (1999), Gately and Huntington
(2001), Hodge (1999), National Institute of Economics and Industry Research (2002), Ninomiya (2002).
The 0:0555 gure is found from the Consumer Expenditure Surveys, 2002, which report a value of 0:064
for the ratio of average energy consumption to average annual expenditures; and 0:8667 for the ratio of
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assumption that the relative consumer price of a unitof energy is equal to one. This
normalization implies that all the predicted tax rates are in addition to current taxes.
Considering the disutility from pollution, we assume that it is increasing and convex
in Y , with the specication
'(Y ) = eh+kY :
We take the pollution generated by energy to be the release of carbon dioxide into the
atmosphere. The carbon content of the polluting good is found according to the carbon
content of each appropriately-weighted component. Using a value of $50 for the social
marginal cost of a ton of carbon,17 we are able to calculate the marginal social damage
of one unit of the polluting good. This translates into a rst-best tax rate of about
10% on the polluting good This leaves one degree of freedom in setting h and k: We
use it by choosing the least convex function compatible with a positive value for every
households most-preferred q.
Turning to the value of the marginal cost of public funds in the US, we use a value of
0:025 for . This is within the range of the existing estimates in the literature, though
rather on the low side; see, e.g., Fullerton (1991) who reports a gure between 0 and 0:12.
However, recall that in our formulation (q   1)y(q) measures the revenue gained by
raising (q 1)y(q) from emission taxes while reducing income taxes by the same amount.
Now, the double-dividend debate is inconclusive on whether this tax recycling does not
in fact exacerbate the existing distortions in the economy rather than mitigating it. To
the extent that the general equilibrium e¤ects of this tax switch (which we do not allow
for) lower the potential gains, one should use a low value for . Nevertheless, while
we set  = 0:025 in our benchmark case, we also set  equal to zero and 0:20 (which
far exceeds the maximum estimate reported by Fullerton) for our sensitivity analyses.
Observe also that, with  = 0:025, the second-best emission tax is about 16%:
Next, we turn our attention to the militantspreferences. Given the denition of
vi()in (14), we need to determine the weights that the two partiesmilitants assign to
the preferences of each voter, !i(). These we nd from Bartels (2002). He estimates a
average net-of-tax to average gross-of-tax income. The $59; 926 value for average income comes from
the 2001 PSID data.
17This is within the range of estimated values of $5:5 to $187; see
http://www.epa.gov/oppt/epp/guidance/top20faqexterchart.htm on the EPA website.
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linear relationship between the ideology (measured on a single dimension) of a senator
and the ideology of his constituents, with di¤erent constituents being assigned di¤erent
weights based on their incomes. He runs this regression separately for democratic (L)
and republican (R) senators for three consecutive sessions of the Congress, 101103.
The weights (a weighted average of the weights derived for the three sessions of the
Congress) are
!L =  0:02 + 0:04  income
!R =  0:86 + 0:099  income.
To apply these to our setting, we modify the weights in two directions. First, the
coe¢ cients of incomes are deated by the variation in the Consumer Price Index between
1990 and 2000. That is, we divide 0:04 and 0:099 above by 1.278. This is to correct
for the fact that Bartels uses incomes expressed in 1990 dollars to calculate the weights,
but in our calculations we use PSID data for the year 2000. Second, we restrict !i to be
nonnegative. Thus, for the Democrats, we set the constant part of !L at zero (instead
of -0.02); and for the Republicans, we use max(0; !R) rather than !R.18
Finally, to calculate the probability that a particular voter participates in the elec-
tion, we continue to rely on Bartels (2002) using his regression of turnout on income.
As with the votersweights, we modify his results (as reported in his Table A6) on
the basis of the consumer price indices for 1990 and 2000. Moreover, given the linear
specication between turnout and income, there is also a need to cap the very rich indi-
vidualsestimated probability of turn out at one. The average turnout in the economy
is then 72%, and the average individual(a person with average income regardless of
the source) participates in the election with a probability of 75.5%.
7 Results
With each party proposing a two-dimensional policy, PUNEs can di¤er along four di-
mensions: qL; L; qR; R: As such, they may be classied in numerous di¤erent ways.
18Bartels calculates these weights based on individuals total incomes, not di¤erentiating between
labor and capital incomes. In using them, we thus assume that the weights the two parties assign to an
individual are conditioned on his total income w + r independently of the source of the income.
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As far as qi (i = L;R) is concerned, the most informative distinction is between taxes
(qi > 1) and subsidies (qi < 1). Specically, along this dimension, we distinguish be-
tween three potential types of results: Both parties propose a tax, both parties propose
a subsidy, one party (either Left or Right) proposes a tax and the other party a subsidy.
Regarding i; a useful distinction is between corner solutions of i = 1 or i = 0;
the votersmost-preferred values for i, and interior solutions where 0 < i < 1. An
interior solution arises when one or both parties decide to o¤er a compromisein order
to placate the militants in the party by pushing them closer to their blisspoint(s), and/or
the opportunists in an attempt to win more votes in the election. As will be seen below,
a large subset of regular PUNEs have this feature. We thus categorize the potential
solutions into three types along this dimension as well: Both parties propose a corner
solution for i; one party (either Left or Right) proposes a corner value and the other
an interior value for i; both the Left and the Right parties propose an interior value
for i:
With three congurations each for (qL; qR) and (L; R), there will be, potentially,
nine di¤erent solution categories. To calculate the PUNEs, we draw at random a huge
number (in the thousands) of possible vectors (qL; L; qR; R) within each of the nine
possible categories, and check whether a particular draw constitutes a PUNE.19 It turns
out that (regular) PUNEs are of two types. In one type (Type I), the parties o¤er a tax
in conjunction with L = R = 0: In the other (Type II), both parties o¤er a subsidy
coupled with an interior value for : See Figure 1. Most importantly, these features are
very robust and remain intact for the various simulations we perform.
7.1 Type I regular PUNEs
Amongst the double corner proposals, only L = R = 0 leads to regular PUNEs:
There are no PUNEs when L and R are both equal to one; nor is it possible to have
an equilibrium with one of the is equal to zero and the other equal to one. Moreover,
19Following Roemer(2001), we compute the PUNEs through a local characterization that makes use
of Farkaslemma. This local characterization ensures that no party has an incentive to deviate locally,
and nor globally if the program solved were globally convex. It is well known, however, that the
probability of winning functions, is, are not in general quasi-concave. We will thus contend ourselves
with identifying local PUNEs.
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Figure 1: Type I and Type II PUNEs
along with i = 0; both parties will o¤er a tax; no equilibrium exists when one or
both parties o¤er a subsidy. Specically, all PUNEs with both L and R taking corner
solutions consist of four-tuples (qL; 0; qR; 0) such that qL and qR lie in the closed interval
between each partys militantsmost-preferred q conditional on  = 0: More precisely,
we have 2:19  qL < qR  2:22; where the most-preferred value of q conditional on
 = 0 is qL = 2:19 for the Left party, and q

R = 2:22 for the Right party. Additionally,
qL = qR = 2:19 is also a PUNE. We shall refer to these solutions as Type I (regular)
PUNEs.
The properties of Type I PUNEs follow from four important properties of our cali-
brated model. First, income e¤ects are smallenough so that q(; ) = eq ((; );m())
is increasing in w and r for qL  qL  qR  qR: Second, preferences are single-peaked
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in q (for a given ). Third, for a given qR, an increase in qL increases the proportion of
the electorate who prefer qL to qR; while, for a given qL, an increase in qR lowers the
proportion of the electorate who prefer qR to qL. Fourth, given that the weights used by
both partiesmilitants are increasing in total income, and that the Right partys mili-
tants put a zero weight on the utility of the poorer individuals, it follows that qL < q

R.
Observe that the second property also implies that a (classical Downsian) majority-
voting equilibrium exists, and that the utility of militants in party i = L;R increases
when their partys proposed q moves closer to their blisspoint qi .
For the purpose of comparison, we also calculate the majority-voting equilibrium
value of q conditional on  = 0; denoted by qM . This is equal to qM = 0:089. Not
surprisingly, with the median wage and the median capital income being respectively
smaller than the average wage and the average capital income, qM < qo: Observe that
the determination of qM is based on the assumption that all citizens participate in the
election with the same probability. As we noted in Section 6, however, this is not the
case empirically. Instead, turnout probability increases with total income. This suggests
that more than 50% of voters (as opposed to citizens) prefer q to be higher than qM .
We can then determine a second value for the majority-voting equilibrium q which takes
the turnout probabilities into account. Denoting this equilibrium by qMV ; we calculate
qMV = 0:095. Observe that qM < qMV < qo. This occurs because adjusting for turnout
probabilities leaves the ratio of median income to average income, for both wage earners
and capital owners, well below one.20
Given the above properties, it is easy to see why any (qL; qR) in the interval qL 
qL < qR  qR is a PUNE. To begin with, the most-preferred policies of the two parties
militants (qL; q

R) constitute, by denition, a PUNE: All deviations from this pair of
policy proposals would decrease the utility of the militants in both parties. Secondly,
qL = qL = qR is also a PUNE: Party Ls militants oppose any deviation from this
point, while Rs opportunists block their partys militantswish to increase qR. Now
take any (qL; qR) with qL < qL and consider how the factions in party L react to a
20Specically, the ratio of median income to average income increases from 61% (for median citizen)
to 73% (for median voter) in case of wage incomes, and from 22% (median citizen) to 26% (median
voter) for capital incomes.
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decrease in qL: This would be supported by Ls militants as it brings them closer to their
blisspoint; on the other hand, the opportunists in party L would oppose this move as it
decreases the partys probability of winning. Similarly, take any (qL; qR) with qR < qR
and consider party Rs factions: Militants would like to increase qR while opportunists
would prefer to decrease it. Allowing i to change as well, does not create deviations
that simultaneously increase a partys probability of winning and its militantsutility.
Intuitively, this occurs because i is on the boundary of the feasible set (i does not
take negative values) which limits the set of admissible deviations.
Other qi-congurations besides those stated above are, however, not PUNEs. It
is easy, for example, to see that no conguration with qL < qL = qR can be a PUNE.
Starting from such a conguration, party L can increase both the utility of the militants
and the partys probability of winning by decreasing qL. As a second example, consider
qL  qL < qR  qR. In this case, both the militants and the opportunists in the
Left party want to increase qL. Similar arguments rule out all other congurations
with L = R = 0: Observe also that despite the limitations imposed by corner values
on the set of admissible deviations, other corner congurations beside L = R = 0
contain no PUNEs. When one or both is (i = L;R) are equal to one, the ability to
reduce i = 1 will be su¢ cient to create possibilities for simultaneously increasing a
partys probability of winning and its militantsutility so that no such conguration
can constitute a PUNE.
Type 1 regular PUNEs are essentially dictated by the preferences of the parties
militants which, as observed earlier, are very far from the majority-voting equilibria qM
and qMV . Summing up, we have:
Result 1 Let qL and q

R denote the Left and the Right partiesmilitantsmost-preferred
prices conditional on  = 0. Type I (regular) PUNEs are characterized by  = 0; and
2:21 = qL  qL < qR  qR = 2:23; plus qL = qR = qL = 2:21:
Observe that with qM < qo < qL < qR, the majority of the electorate will vote for
the Left party. Specically, the Left party has a probability of winning the election
that varies from 90:8% to 91:2% across all possible congurations of qL and qR; with an
average value of 91%:
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7.2 Type II regular PUNEs
When both L and R take interior values, a second type of PUNEs emerges involving
both parties o¤ering a subsidy. It will not be possible to have one or both parties o¤ering
a tax in combination with interior values for L and R: Specically, all PUNEs of Type
II share the following characteristics: 0 < qR < qL < 1 and 0 < L < R < 1: Unlike
Type I PUNEs, it is the opportunists in the two parties who play the major role in
determining these PUNEs. With qL varying between 0.291 and 0.995 and qR between
0.284 and 0.992, these PUNEs are closer to the most-preferred policy of an individual
with the median wage and the median capital income. To see who votes for which party,
recall that this choice is essentially determined by two factors. First, the lower subsidy
o¤ered by party L attracts the higher income voters (aggregate income e¤ect). Second,
individuals who derive a higher proportion of their income from wages favor party Ls
proposed budgetary rule while those with high capital incomes prefer party Rs (income
composition e¤ect). This is the case because with both parties o¤ering a subsidy on the
polluting good, whether the Left or the Right party wins, the voters know that they
will have to be taxed in order to nance the environmental subsidy. With a high 
punishing the high-wage-earners more and a low  punishing the high-capitalincome
individuals more, the former group will want a low  (L) and the latter a high  (R):
For certain voters, both factors reinforce each other. Those with a high wage income
and low capital income prefer party Ls policy to party Rs, while individuals with low
total income but a high share of capital income prefer party Rs policy. For other
voters, the two e¤ects go in opposite directions. In all these cases, however, the income
composition e¤ect dominates the aggregate income e¤ect. The set of voters who are
indi¤erent between the two parties policies is thus given by an upward-sloping line
in the (w; r) space. All individuals above this line (i.e., relatively more endowed in
capital income) prefer party Rs policy while individuals below it prefer party Ls. Put
di¤erently, with Type II PUNEs, it is the electorates composition of wage and capital
incomes that polarizes the society.
The end outcome in terms of attracting voters appears to be very close for the two
parties, with a small edge to party L. It faces a probability of winning that ranges from
21
48.9% to 69.6% (depending on the particular regular PUNE that is selected). Moreover,
assuming each PUNE is equiprobable, party Ls average probability of winning (among
all PUNEs) is 54.1%. Naturally, party Rs probability of winning varies from 30.4% to
51.1% with an average rate of 45.9%. These probabilities are, intuitively, very comfort-
ing. At 54.1% and 45.9%, the average probabilities of winning for the two parties are
rather close. Moreover, the maximum winning probabilities for the two parties over the
set of Type II PUNEs exceed, while their minimum winning probabilities fall below, the
50% mark.
Summing up, we have obtained the following main results
Result 2 Type II PUNEs share the following characteristics: 0 < L < R < 1 (both
parties o¤er an interior solution) and qR < qL < 1 (both parties o¤er a subsidy);
specically, qL varies from 0.295 to 0.995 and qR from 0.284 to 0.992. Party Ls average
probability of winning (among all PUNEs) is 54.1%, and party Rs is 45.9%.
Finally, three interesting features of these PUNEs are worth emphasizing. One is the
fact that they all entail a subsidy on the environmental good. The subsidies range from
0.5% to 70.9% for qL (with an average of 24.9%) and from 0.8% to 71.6% for qR (with an
average of 30.9%). These gures underscore the importance of distributional concerns in
ensuring political support for environmental policies. The literature on environmental
taxation, with few exceptions, has shied away from such considerations.21 In our setup,
on the other hand, distributional issues take the center stage.
A second interesting feature of Type II PUNEs is that the two parties always com-
promise in their choices of ; o¤ering an interior solution. Specically, L varies from
0.01 to 0.98 with an average of 0.425 while R varies from 0.1 to 0.995 with an average
of 0.69. This aspect too underlines the importance of generating political support for
environmental policies (through political compromise). The compromise over  turns
out to be a particularly striking feature of the PUNEs; most other equilibrium concepts,
even when they are not empty in multidimensional choice sets, do not share this feature;
21 In particular, the burgeoning literature of the past decade has emphasized e¢ ciency issues that
arise in second-best settings; see the many papers that appear in the edited volume by Goulder (2003).
Cremer, Gahvari and Ladoux (2003) is one exception.
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see Cremer et al. (2004b).22
Third, and most interestingly, we observe that Type II PUNEs correspond to the
observed making of environmental tax policy in the US. That is, the policy has been
dictated more by the concerns of the opportunists who care most about winning elec-
tions. However, the existence of Type I PUNEs suggests the possibility of a change in
this policy and arriving at an equilibrium with the militants at the helm.
7.3 Income e¤ects and distortions
To investigate the robustness of our results, we have calculated, in addition to our
benchmark case, the set of PUNEs for two extreme values of the income elasticity of
demand for the average consumer, ; and two extreme values of . These are reported
in Tables 1 and 2. Starting with the reported numbers in Table 1, the striking feature
of our results is their robustness to income e¤ects. The same two sets of PUNEs, Type
I and Type II, comprise the political equilibria. Type I PUNEs are characterized by
a huge tax with L = R = 0; and Type II by a subsidy with interior solutions for
L; R: Observe also that in the case of Type I PUNEs, qL and q

R both decline as 
increases. This follows our theoretical result in Lemma 1 concerning the direct negative
relationship between income and the most-preferred values of q: The gures also show
that as  increases, the probability of winning of the Left party decreases under Type I
PUNEs and increases under Type II PUNEs.
Turning next to the e¤ects of ; we again note that our results are remarkably robust;
The same two PUNE types emerge with the exact same characteristics. Observe that
in this case as  increases, qL and q

R also increase. This is in contrast with the e¤ect of
an increase in : The reason is that an increase in  e¤ectively lowers real incomes and
thus has the same e¤ect as a decrease in . Nevertheless, we observe that, as with ;
increasing  causes the probability of winning of the Left party to decrease under Type
I PUNEs and to increase under Type II PUNEs.
22This is also the case for probabilistic voting which results in  = 0; see Cremer et al. (2005).
Levy (2004) introduces a model wherein candidates are citizens who can only commit to implement
their most-preferred policy, and parties are coalitions of candidates restricted to propose policies inside
their Pareto set. In this setup, one could obtain an interior  as an equilibrium provided that it belongs
to the Pareto set of some coalition of citizens. Applying this framework in our model with a continuum
of citizens will be a rather impossible task.
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Table 1. Income e¤ects and the PUNEs:
( = 0:025)
Type 1 Type 2
(L = R = 0)
 = 0
qL q

R L (average) L qL R qR L (average)
2.4851 2.5141 0.9551 Min: 0.0033 0.3029 0.0607 0.2884 0.5181
Max: 0.8588 0.9929 0.9969 0.9876
 = 0:405
2.2119 2.2345 0.9099 Min: 0.0047 0.2910 0.1005 0.2842 0.5405
Max: 0.9873 0.9949 0.9988 0.9924
 = 0:810
1.9448 1.9615 0.7094 Min: 0.0061 0.5453 0.1064 0.5110 0.6111
Max: 0.9321 0.9931 0.9962 0.9848
7.4 Other equilibria?
In subsection 7.1 we argued that Type I PUNEs are the only equilibria of our model
when L and R both take corner values. Here we shall discuss why Type II PUNEs
will be the only possible equilibria when L and R both take interior values. We will
also discuss why no equilibria exists when either L or R takes a corner value, and
the other an interior value. To develop an intuition for these results, we rst study the
reasons as to why a Type II PUNE constitutes an equilibrium so that neither party
wants to deviate from such an allocation.
7.4.1 Type II PUNEs as equilibria
At an interior PUNE, we have the gradient of the utility of a partys militants, in (q; )
space, to be exactly opposite to the gradient of that partys probability of winning.
Considering each partys militantsmost protable deviations, we note that their most-
preferred values of qi are larger than one (they prefer a tax) whatever the value of i:
Now, given that Type II PUNEs are characterized by both parties o¤ering a qi < 1; the
militants in both parties would always prefer a larger qi: As for i, the militants most
prefer i = 1 when qi < 1: Consequently, they will also want to increase i.
Turning next to the opportunists, what they would wish to do depends on the (w; r)
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Table 2. Distortionary income taxes and the PUNEs:
( = 0:405)
Type 1 Type 2
(L = R = 0)
 = 0
qL q

R L (average) L qL R qR L (average)
2.1977 2.2212 0.9104 Min: 0.0004 0.3360 0.0750 0.3210 0.5220
Max: 0.9158 0.9920 0.9980 0.9860
 = 0:025
2.2119 2.2345 0.9099 Min: 0.0047 0.2910 0.1005 0.2842 0.5405
Max: 0.9873 0.9949 0.9988 0.9924
 = 0:2
2.2943 2.3122 0.9068 Min: 0.0010 0.3711 0.1391 0.3590 0.5999
Max: 0.9891 0.9708 0.9988 0.9592
distribution among the voters. This distribution determines, for a given pair of policy
proposals, how many people vote for each party. It turns out that the (w; r) distribution
is such that a partys choice of  will be the more crucial parameter in securing votes for
the partys platform. Now given that qi < 1 for both parties, an increase in i by any
party appeals more to people who have a lot of capital income. That capital income is
positively skewed then implies that by increasing its proposed value of i; a party loses
more votes (among the low-r people) than it gains (among large-r people), thus lowering
its probability of winning the election. This result holds true for all PUNEs even though
the turnout probability increases with income. As a consequence, opportunists in both
parties would like to decrease i in order to attract the votes of the more numerous low-
r people. The same reasoning applies to an increase in qi by any party. High-income
people benet, and low-income people lose, from an increase in q. With incomes being
positively skewed, the party that increases qi loses more votes among poor people than
it gains among richer people. Consequently, opportunists in both parties would prefer
to decrease their qi as well in an attempt to increase their probability of winning.
7.4.2 Opposing tax/subsidy proposals accompanying interior values of 
Interestingly, there are no regular PUNEs with this property. That is, there are no four-
tuples (qL; L; qR; R) with qL < 1 < qR such that party Ls militants prefer (qL; L)
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to (qR; R). Nor are there any four-tuples (qL; L; qR; R) with qR < 1 < qL such that
party Rs militants prefer (qR; R) to (qL; L). Intuitively, because both Ls and Rs
militants put more weight on higher income people, they both prefer a tax to a subsidy
whatever the proposed value of :
7.4.3 Tax proposals by both parties accompanying interior values of 
The militants of a party prefer to combine a tax with a lower value of  (see the proof
of Result 1). Additionally, in all regular 4-tuples (qL; L; qR; R) party Ls militants
always prefer a higher value of qL regardless of the value of . Party Rs militants,
on the other hand, may prefer a lower as well as a higher value of qR (i.e., qR may
exceed party Rs militantsmost-preferred value of q in regular 4-tuples). Turning to
the opportunists, their behavior varies according to the circumstances they face: there
exist regular four-tuples for which party is (i = L;R) probability of winning increases
with both i and qi, regular four-tuples for which this probability decreases with both
i and qi, and yet other regular four-tuples for which this probability increases with qi
and decreases with i, or the opposite. Given these properties, there exist no PUNE
with both parties proposing a tax: there is no four-tuple of this type for which party
Ls opportunists want to block the militants by wanting to increase L and decrease
qL; while at the same time party Rs opportunists want to go in a direction opposite to
that favored by Rs militants. In other words, when both parties o¤er interior values for
 coupled with taxes, one can always nd deviations that are favored by the militants
and the opportunists of either one or both parties. However, the properties of these
deviations change from one regular 4-tuple to another.
7.4.4 An interior  proposal countered with a corner 
In this case, the party that o¤ers a corner value for  always has a deviation that pleases
both its opportunists and its militants. This occurs regardless of which party o¤ers a
corner solution for , whether it o¤ers  = 0 or 1, or whether the parties propose a tax
or a subsidy.
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8 Concluding remarks
This paper has presented a political economy model to explain the low emission taxes
in the U.S., and the fact that neither the Republicans and nor the Democrats advocate
higher emission tax rates. The paper has two distinctive features and has arrived at
two main conclusions. The rst feature is its modeling of political competition which
has been done à la Roemer (2001). In this setup, each party consists of two factions:
one cares about the policies (militants), and the other about the probability of winning
the election (opportunists). The equilibrium solution concept is the Party Unanimity
Nash Equilibrium(PUNE). The second feature is that the model has been calibrated
on the basis of the U.S. data. The voters are U.S. households as represented by the
2001 PSID survey, and the parameters of their utility function are calculated using U.S.
studies.
The main result of the paper is that the PUNEs can be of two types. In one, both
parties propose a very huge tax rate (combined with a budgetary rule which calls for
all tax proceeds to be rebated solely on the basis of the voterscapital incomes). These
tax rates correspond to the most-preferred tax rates of the militants in the Democratic
and the Republican parties. If the parties o¤er these tax rates, the Democrats will beat
the Republicans with a probability that exceeds 90%.
In the other, all PUNEs entail a subsidy. This underscores the importance of distrib-
utional concerns in ensuring political support for environmental policies. Moreover, the
two parties always compromise in their choices of a budgetary rule, o¤ering an interior
solution (while voters prefer the two extreme values). This underlines the importance
of generating political support for environmental policies through political compromise.
Under these PUNEs, the maximum winning probabilities for the two parties exceed,
while their minimum winning probabilities fall below, the 50% mark. These PUNEs
appear to be more consistent with the US environmental policy which avoids high en-
vironmental taxes, and is dictated more by the concerns of the opportunists who care
most about winning elections. Nevertheless, the existence of Type I PUNEs suggests the
possibility of a change in this policy and arriving at an equilibrium with the militants
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at the helm.23
It will be interesting to undertake the same calibration exercise for other countries,
especially those in the West, to test the robustness of our conclusions. This, however,
requires quite a bit of care. The two-party political competition approach adopted here
is more suited to the US, and less to the majority of European countries.24 Another
extension of this analysis, would make the militantsutility endogenous by assuming that
they maximize the average utility of citizens who vote for their party at equilibrium.
These avenues are left for future research.
23Type II PUNEs may be considered as the more reasonable equilibria on two counts. First,
equilibrium conditions are more stringent to satisfy for interior PUNEs (Type II) than for corner PUNEs.
This is because many deviations that would be favored by both militants and opportunists are not
feasible with corner solutions; they dont belong to the feasible set. Thus, if the feasible set for  is
given by (0; 1) and thus open, Type I PUNEs disappear. Secondly, one can argue that in the long term
the opportunists will stick to a particular party only if that party has a high enough probability to
win elections. On the basis of this criterion, it is clear that Type I PUNEs are not viableequilibria.
Under Type I PUNEs, the majority of the electorate will vote for the Left party. As noted earlier, the
Left party has a probability of winning the election that varies from 90:8% to 91:2% across all possible
congurations of qL and qR; with an average value of 91%: The 9% probability of winning is too low to
keep the Right partys opportunists to stick to their party for long.
24Observe also that with the election turnout rates being much higher among the poor of Europe, the
feature that all parties put relatively a higher weight on the wealthy is unlikely to apply to Europe.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2: To prove part (i), rewrite the rst-order condition for the most-
preferred level of q as,
@V (q;m; )
@q
= a0(q) +mb0(q) + 

b0(q)R(q) + b(q)R0(q)
  '0(y(q))y0(q) = 0: (A1)
Let eq(;m) denote the solution to equation (A1). We have,
@V
@q
(eq(;m); ;m)  0:
Di¤erentiating with respect to  and m yields equations (12)(13) in the text, where
@2V (q; ; )=@q2 < 0 by the concavity assumption (second-order condition).
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